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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, ) 
DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND) 
PROFESSIONAL LICENSING, ) Administrative Case No. 
DOPL-2002-123 
Respondent/Appellee ) 
Appellate Case No. 20050894-CA 
vs. ) 
ANTONE R. THOMPSON, pro-se ) 
Petitioner/Appellant. ) 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT THOMPSON 
Appeal is from the lesser courts judgements, sentences, findings of fact and 
- orders denying Appellant his right to due process of law. The judgements are from 
an administrative court in Salt Lake City, Salt Lake Co, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Judge Steve Eckland for the first two orders, then Masuda Medcalf for administrative 
review, presiding: 
The Department of Professional Licensing, hereinafter referred to as DOPL. 
ANNINA M. MITCHELL(#2274) 
Utah Solicitor General 
Mark L. Shurtleff 
Utah Attorney General 
P.O. 140854 
Salt Lake City, Ut. 84114-0854 
Attorney for appellee, respondent 
FILED 
(Brief of Appellant Thompson) UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
ANTONE RODNEY THOMPSON 
350 S. 500 W. 
Cedar City 
Utah 84720 
Telephone (435)586-1345 FAX 
Appellant/Petitioner pro se 
MAY 1 2 2006 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • a * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, 
DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND 
PROFESSIONAL LICENSING, 
Respondent/Appellee 
vs. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
THOMPSON 
Administrative Case No. 
DOPL-2002-123 
Appellate Case No. 20050894-CA 
ANTONE R. THOMPSON, pro-se 
Petitioner/Appellant. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter, jurisdiction originating with 
the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Utah State Code § 78-2a-3(2)(a)and(b)(i)and(ii) 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issues presented for appeal in this case by Appellant are as follows: 
ISSUE #1: Whether or not the administrative court erred in denying the 
Appellant's Due Process of Law in withholding and telling the 
Appellant that they cannot find the transcripts for the original 
hearing of The Division of Occupational and Professional 
Licensing, Order and Finding of Fact, Conclusion of Law and 
Recommended Order, dated Oct. 27, 1999, Case#: DOPL-98-
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105? This hearing has no transcripts. Therefore, is without facts, 
denying the Appellant his right to due process of law. 
This the Appellant believes is in violation of the US Constitution, 
Amendments V and XIV. 
ISSUE #2: Whether or not the administrative court erred in denying the 
Appellant his right to the DOPL's administrative Two-Day Rule, 
that the DOPL is not to present a stipulation to a licensee within 
two days prior to a hearing for action against a licensee? The 
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing, Conclusion 
of Law and recommended Order on Motion to Set Aside 
Stipulation and Order, dated 16th of Feb., 2005, Case#: DOPL-
2002-123; was in violation of the administrations own Two Day 
Rule, that no stipulation will be allowed unless presented to the 
licensee prior to two days before a hearing. This stipulation was 
placed before the Appellant at the hearing without adequate time 
to read the stipulation and while the Appellant was under 
medication for an excruciating toothache(percocet). The 
Applicant was under threat, duress and coercion. This the 
Appellant believes is in violation of the Utah Administration Act. 
ISSUE #3: Whether or not the administrative court erred when they 
admittedly impaired the obligation of a stipulation or contract: US 
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examination and having worked for four years under professional 
engineers, he received his Professional Engineers License. 
Appellant has worked as an engineer for fifteen years without 
any failure, lawsuits or to his knowledge any unhappy clients. 
Appellant believes this is in violation of US Constitution, 
Amendment V and IV, deprivation of liberty and property without 
Due Process of Law. 
STANDARD FOR REVIEW 
The standard of review is believed to be one of "correctness" as it applies to 
questions of law and the interpretation of statue and procedure of "clearly erroneous" 
as it applies to questions of fact. See State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 and State v. 
Rhoades, 818 P.2d 1048 (Utah App. 1991); see also State v. Gibbons. 770 P.2d 
1133 (Utah 1989); and State v. Gerrald, 584 P.2d 885 (Utah 1978). 
The trial court has broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence in this 
determination which typically will only be disturbed if it constitutes an abuse of 
discretion. An administration court abuses its discretion if it acts unreasonably. See 
State v. Comer, 2002 UT App. 219, fl 11, 51 P.3d 55 (quoting State v. Whittle, 1999 
UT 96,fl 20, 989 P.2d 52), cert. Denied, 59 P.3d 603 (Utah 2002). 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The Appellant is aware of no statutory provision that is dispositive but believes 
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the following apply: 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2-(2)(l) (1953, as amended) 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2-(2)(4) (1953, as amended) 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 58-37(d)-4 (Utah 1953, as amended) 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 58-37(d)-5 (Utah 1953, as amended) 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-2-303(1) (1953, as amended) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE of the CASE: This is an administrative case involving the issues of the 
denial of liberty and property of a Citizen of the United States of America. The 
Appellant was contacted by an investigator of the DOPL in 1998 regarding a letter 
that the Appellant stamped and signed regarding the structural member sizes that 
a contractor showed on his sketches for an addition to a metal building in Cedar City, 
Utah. 
The investigator told the Appellant that he would be cited for aiding and 
abetting the unlicensed practice of architecture. Then said, "if you aided and abetted 
the unlicensed practice of architecture, I guess I need to charge someone with 
practicing architecture without a license, it looks like you(Appellant) was a target 
here". He then told the Appellant that "there was someone in a high position that was 
after him (Appellant)". The investigator then discovered who was practicing 
architecture without a license and charged him as well. The contractor that was 
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charged with practicing architecture without a license said "how am I guilty of 
practicing architecture without a license for sketching up a design of what the owner 
wanted to do with an addition to his building, then going in to the building inspector 
to ask what I needed to do to get a building permit and the inspector told me to go 
to Toney Thompson to get a letter and he would give the owner a building permit?" 
Then the investigator told him this is like a traffic ticket, you can either plead guilty 
and pay the fine or you can fight the issue in court, you choose. The contractor 
signed the guilty plea, paid the fine and went his way. The Appellant also wanted 
to do likewise, plead guilty, pay the fine and go on his way. However, the Appellant 
didn't believe that he was guilty of the citation. After the Appellant talked to an 
attorney, who reminded the Appellant that the Iron Co. Attorney, Scott Burns (a 
golfing buddy of the DOPL investigator), could press charges against him for aiding 
and abetting the unlicensed practice of architecture after he signed the plea 
agreement, which appellant understood would be $2000 fine and 6 months in jail. 
The Appellant decided to fight for his innocense. 
Scott Burns was involved with the Appellants daughters case in 1997, where 
a man had followed his 12 year old daughter on her paper route and sexually 
assaulted her. The Appellant was approached by Scott Burns after the assault, and 
told the Appellant that he should drop the case against the assailant, "as he just 
wants to go to jail, and that it would just cost the county money". The Appellant told 
Scott Burns that" I don't want to be party to the action of this man when he assaults 
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another little girl, that I want him off the streets as long as he can". After the 
Appellant obtained the amount of $2,500 for his daughters corrective counseling, he 
took the assailant to court, where Scott Burns told the judge that Mr. Thompson 
(Appellant) just wants the money so he can buy a car. After an attorney told the 
Appellant that Scott Burns actions in court constituted deformation of character. The 
Appellant tried to obtain the video tape of the hearing, but Scott Burns had checked 
out the video tape and lost it. The Appellant was not able to take action against Scott 
Burns. In 1998 the Appellant got a speeding ticket where Scott Burns was the 
prosecuting attorney. The Appellant fought the speeding ticket with a number of 
questions about the ticket. Scott Burns issued a warrant for the arrest of the 
Appellant and held him in a masonry cell without bedding or amenities, only a roll of 
toilet paper for a pillow, with the temperature turned down low, for three days. Scott 
Burns held the Appellant three days in solitary confinement with the exceptions of 
guards coming to interrogate, who unnecessarily physically assaulted the Appellant 
from time to time. After being released the Appellant tried to obtain prison records 
through GRAMA requests of the Appellants stay in the Iron County Correctional 
Facility. The Appellant was told that "the only records he could obtain were the 
records approved by Scott Burns". These are the reasons the Appellant didn't just 
plead guilty and pay the 1997 Citation by the DOPL. The Appellant had every reason 
to believe that Scott Burns would pursue addition action against the Appellant if the 
Appellant plead guilty and paid the fine, ie.$2000 fine and six months in jail, most 
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likely under Scott Burns. The Appellant did not believe that he was guilty of Aiding 
and Abetting the unlicensed practice of architecture. 
The State of Utah dismissed the charges against the Appellant of Aiding and 
Abetting the Unlicensed Practice of Architecture. The investigator for the DOPL then 
cited the Appellant for Unprofessional Conduct of Aiding and Abetting the 
Unlicensed Practice of Architecture. A hearing was held, which the Appellant was 
not allowed his witnesses or evidence and has been told that there exists no 
transcripts for the hearing where the Order placing the Appellant's license on 
probation was made, noted as the "The Division of Occupational and Professional 
Licensing, Order and Finding of Fact, Conclusion of Law and Recommended Order, 
dated Oct. 29,1999, Case#:DOPL-98-105". Then approximately six years later the 
DOPL held a hearing on Jan. 12,1995, for the purpose of revoking the Appellants 
license. At which time the DOPL, in violation of their own Two-Day-Rule presented 
the Appellant a stipulation. The hearing Jan. 12, 1995, was held at 10:00 am. The 
DOPL presented the stipulation. There was some discussion as to a 30 day stay of 
the stipulation, where the attorney for the DOPL made the changes. The DOPL 
presented the stipulation again at approximately 10:10 am after which there were a 
number of interruptions, which left insufficient time to read or review the stipulation. 
The Appellant wrote his name to the stipulation at approximately 10:25 am. DOPL 
was aware that the Appellant had not read the stipulation that the Appellant was 
acting different, not quit right. The Appellant was under threat, duress and cohesion, 
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being made aware that the DOPL's intention of revoking his license and that the 
Appellant was medicated on percocet for a toothache. The DOPL, the day after they 
signed the stipulation violated their own stipulation, by posting the suspension of the 
Appellant's license on the DOPL website, after Appellant was told he had 30 days 
before his license would be suspended. Appellant within three days rescinded the 
stipulation for cause and or fraud. The DOPL acknowledged violating the stipulation, 
yet offered no relief or award. The Appellant is now appealing the legal proceedings 
of the DOPL. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On or about the 3rd day of Feb., 1998 the Appellant was cited for Aiding and 
Abetting the unlicensed practice of architecture. 
2. On or about the 5th day of Mar., 1998 the State of Utah Dismissed the 
charges of aiding and abetting the unlicensed practice of architecture against the 
Appellant. 
3. On or about the 15th day of May, 1998 the DOPL cited the Appellant for 
unprofessional conduct of aiding and abetting the unlicensed practice of architecture. 
4. On or about the 12th day of Jan.,2005 the DOPL entered into a stipulation 
with the Appellant. 
5. On or about the 13th day of Jan.,2005 the DOPL violated the stipulation that 
they wrote and entered into with the Appellant. 
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6. On or about the 13th day of Jan., 2005, the Appellant received his copy of 
the DOPL's signed stipulation. 
7. On or about the 18th day of Jan.,2005 the day after MLK holiday the 
Appellant sent the DOPL his intentions of rescinding the stipulation for cause and or 
fraud, that they openly had violated. 
8. On or about the 12th day of Feb.,2005 the DOPL held a hearing excusing 
themselves for violating the stipulation that they wrote and signed. 
9. On or about the 6th day of Apr., 2005 the DOPL denied a stay of 
enforcement of the stipulation of Jan. 12,2005. Even though the Appellant had met 
all requirements to practice as a licensed engineer and had practiced for 15 years. 
Without any failures, lawsuits or unhappy clients to his knowledge. 
10. On or about 4th of Aug., 2005 the Department of Commerce withdrew their 
judicial/agency review of the DOPL. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A 
The administrative court erred in not keeping the transcripts of the original 
hearing against the Appellant, denying him due process of law. Had the transcripts 
been kept they would have shown that the DOPL did obstruct the Appellants ability 
to obtain an administrative attorney. Months prior to the hearing the Appellant was 
in a meeting with an administrative attorney who listened to his side concerning the 
Aiding and Abetting the Unlicensed Practice of Architecture. The attorney told the 
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Appellant "Mr. Thompson who did you piss off' the Appellant told the attorney about 
Scott Burns, Iron County Attorney and the attorney said "say no more, I know all 
about Scott Burns". The attorney called the DOPL on conference calling. The 
administrator told the attorney to take conference calling off so that he could talk to 
him privately, which he did. A few minutes later the attorney told the Appellant that 
he was not able to represent the Appellant because it looked like the DOPL had a 
personal issue with the Appellant. 
The missing transcripts would have shown that one of the DOPL board 
members, which was acting as jury in the original hearing, said "this matter with the 
Mr. Thompson (Appellant) is too trivial to bring before the Board of Professional 
Engineers, that the building inspector should have just called Mr. Thompson 
(Appellant) and resolved the matter right then and there without having all this to do". 
The administrator with the DOPL then told that board member that he needed to talk 
to him in private, at which time the board member was taken out of court, briefed and 
was brought back in with an entirely new disposition. 
The missing transcripts would have shown that the Appellant was denied his 
rights to witnesses that had first hand knowledge of the facts. That he was denied 
his exhibits and affidavits of the facts. 
The missing transcripts would have shown that this administrative court ruled 
against the Appellant without hearing the evidence, testimonies and witnesses. 
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B 
The Stipulation imposed upon the Appellant at the day and hour of the 
hearing did violate the DOPL's own standards and rules, that of the Two-day-rule, 
stating: The DOPL is not to enter into any stipulation with a licensee within two days 
prior to a hearing, and there is probably a good case as why they put this rule into 
their documents. The Appellant is sure that if he had more time he could find the 
court case that implemented the two-day-rule. That the stipulation was arbitrary, 
capricious, without merit or reason, vague, ambiguous and misleading, and 
therefore, the DOPL did err imposing the stipulation. 
C 
That the DOPL did err in denying the Appellant a stay of the stipulation, not 
having any good grounds to deny the Appellant the ability to practice. Imposing a 
guilty until proven innocent doctrine. Knowing that the Appellant has graduated from 
the University of Utah, successfully passing the Engineer in Training, the 
Professional Engineers Exam and filling his four years work in training under a 
licensed engineer. That the Appellant has no failures in his designs or work, no law 
suits against him for his engineering, or to his knowledge no unhappy clients. 
Therefore, a stay of the stipulation until he has had his day in court or until he had 
his due process of law would be required of the DOPL. 
D 
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The Department of Commerce did err in not holding the DOPL accountable 
for acts violating their own rules, as well as allowing the DOPL to violate their own 
stipulation which they wrote, without any penalties or consequences. 
ARGUMENTS 
A 
The administrative court erred in not keeping the transcripts of the original 
hearing against the Appellant denying him due process of law. This the Appellant 
believes is in violation of the US Constitution, Amendments V and XIV. 
B 
The Stipulation that was imposed upon the Appellant at the day and hour of 
the hearing. This violate the DOPL's own standards and rules that of the two-day-
rule, stating that the DOPL is not to enter into or offer any stipulation within two days 
prior to a hearing, and there is probably a good case as why they put this rule into 
their documents. 
C 
That the DOPL did err in denying the Appellant a stay of the 
stipulation, not having any grounds to deny the Appellant the ability to practice. 
Denying the Appellant his due process of law, taking liberty and property without 
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due process of law, this is believed to be in violation of US Constitution, 
Amendment V and IV. 
D 
That The Department of Commerce did err in not holding the DOPL 
accountable for acts violating their own rules and for allowing the DOPL to violate 
their own stipulation which they wrote, without any penalties. The DOPL violated 
their own written stipulation and admitted to this, which the appellant believes is in 
violated the US Constitution, Article I § 10, Impairing the obligation of contracts. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF REQUESTED 
There are a lot of underlying issues beneath the surface and a lot of 
circumstantial evidence that leads the Appellant to believe that the action against 
him has nothing to do with engineering and everything to do with retribution. 
The relief the Appellant is seeking is: 
Judgement reversing the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing, 
Order and Finding of Fact, Conclusion of Law and Recommended Order, dated 
Oct.,27 and 29,1999 or a Trial De Novo. 
And, or 
Judgement reversing the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing, 
Conclusion of Law and recommended Order on Motion to Set Aside Stipulation and 
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Order, dated 16th of Feb.,2005, Case#:DOPL-2002-123 and or Trial De Novo. 
And, or 
Judgement reversing the Department of Commerce, Finding of Fact, 
Conclusion of Law, Order Granting Motion to Strike, and Order on Review, dated 
Aug. 4,2005 and or Trial De Novo. 
And, or 
Judgement reversing The Department of Commerce, Order Regarding Stay 
Request, dated 6th April,2005, case#:DOPL-2002-123. 
This Brief for Appeal is made timely and in good faith by: 
ntone Rodney Thompson, Petitioner pro se 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the 12th day of May, 2006, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Brief for appeal was hand delivered to the following: 
ANNINA M. MITCHELL(#2274) 
Utah Solicitor General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
P.O. 140854 
Salt Lake City, Ut. 84114-0854 
Telephone: (801)366-0180 
Utah Court of appeals 
450 South State Street 
P.O. Box 140230 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230 
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ADDENDUM 
Exhibit A 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSE OF 
ANTONE R. THOMPSON 
TO PRACTICE AS A PROFESSIONAL ENGINEER 
IN THE STATE OF UTAH 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND RECOMMENDED ORDER 
Case No. DOPL-98-105 
Appearances: 
Jeffrey C. Hunt for the Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing 
Antone R. Thompson for Respondent 
BY THE BOARD: 
A September 21, 1999 hearing was conducted in the above-
entitled proceeding before J. Steven Eklund, Administrative Law 
Judge for the Department of Commerce, and the Professional 
Engineers and Professional Land Surveyors Board. Members of the 
Board present were Charles Henry Richardson, Barry C. Anderson, 
Robert Knox, Hardin A. Whitney, Scott F. McNeil and Stanley S. 
Postma. 
The remaining Board member (Kenneth Lawrence DeVries) was 
not present when the hearing began. Accordingly, Mr. Devries did 
not participate as a Board member in this proceeding. A. Gary 
Bowen, Director of the Division of Occupational and Professional 
Licensing, joined the hearing in progress. 
Thereafter, evidence was offered and received. The Board, 
being fully advised on the premises, now enters its Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and submits the following Recommended 
Order for review and action by the Division: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Respondent is, and at all time relevant to this 
proceeding has been, licensed to practice as a professional 
engineer in this state. Respondent was initially licensed on 
February 21, 1989. 
2. John Pace, a Cedar City businessman, submitted a set of 
commercial construction plans to the Cedar City Building 
Department on January 25, 1998 to obtain a building permit. The 
plans were construction drawings for a new warehouse and showroom 
designed as an addition to an existing structure. 
3. Glenn Scott Jensen, a licensed general contractor, had 
prepared the just-described plans at the request of Mr. Pace. 
Mr. Jensen is not licensed as an engineer or architect. The 
construction drawings which Mr. Jensen prepared do not contain 
the seal of any licensed professional engineer or architect. 
4. The construction plans which Mr. Pace submitted to the 
Cedar City Building Department included a January 14, 1998 cover 
letter, prepared by Respondent, which recites that Mr. Jensen had 
contacted Respondent to provide engineering services relative to 
the construction plans. The letter recites Respondent "reviewed 
the plans and approved the structure as shown on the plans". 
5. Respondent signed the January 14, 1998 letter and he 
2 
also affixed his professional engineer seal to that letter. 
Respondent attached a six (6) page addendum to the letter. The 
attachment consists of generic notes which set forth general 
engineering specifications relative to concrete, steel, masonry 
and wood materials. 
6. The various specifications set forth in the attachment 
to the January 14, 1998 letter indicate those specifications 
would conform to the 1994 edition of the Uniform Building Codes. 
However, the 1997 Code edition governed all construction in Utah 
when the plans in question were submitted to the Cedar City 
Building Department. The specifications set forth in the general 
notes attached to those plans are not consistent with those 1997 
Code requirements. 
7. Based on the substantial and credible evidence 
presented, Mr. Jensen designed and prepared the construction 
plans in question without Respondent's supervision or oversight. 
An engineer's review and seal of those plans was required to 
obtain a Cedar City building permit. Based on the substantial 
and credible evidence presented, and the reasonable inferences 
drawn therefrom, the January 14, 1998 letter constitutes 
Respondent's approval of the plans as drawn by Mr. Jensen. 
8. Cedar City building officials reviewed the plans and 
determined they were not accurate and complete. Accordingly, no 
building permit was issued based on those plans. 
3 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
U.C.A. §58-1-401(2) provides the Division may revoke, 
suspend, restrict, place on probation, issue a public or private 
reprimand to, or otherwise act upon the license of any licensee 
who: 
(a) . . .has engaged in unprofessional 
conduct, as defined by statute or rule under 
this title; 
(b) . . . has engaged in unlawful conduct 
as defined by statute under this title. 
Section 58-1-501 (1) (a) generally defines unprofessional 
conduct to include: 
. . . practicing or engaging in, 
representing oneself to be practicing or 
engaging in, or attempting to practice or 
engage in any occupation or profession 
requiring licensure under this title if the 
person is: 
(i) not licensed to do so or not exempted 
from licensure under this title . . . . 
The Division asserts Respondent engaged in unlawful conduct 
because he aided and abetted the unlicenced practice of 
architecture when: (1) he approved the construction plans and 
affixed his seal on a letter of verification pertaining to the 
structural engineering of those plans; (2) he provided 
specifications to the plans which were not drawn by a licensed 
architect or professional engineer; and (3) he affixed his seal 
to plans which were not prepared under his supervision. 
However, the Board finds and concludes Respondent would not 
have been engaged in the unauthorized practice of architecture 
4 
had he directly prepared the plans in question. Such work would 
have been incidental to the proper scope of Respondent's practice 
as a professional engineer. 
Thus, no proper legal basis exists to find and conclude 
Respondent aided and/or abetted the unlicenced practice of 
architecture merely because he approved the construction plans, 
affixed his seal to a letter of verification pertinent to those 
plans, provided specifications to the plans which were not 
prepared by a licensed architect or professional engineer and 
affixed his seal to the plans which were not prepared under his 
supervision. Accordingly, the Board finds and concludes 
Respondent has not violated §58-1-501(1)(a) and no proper basis 
exists to conclude he was engaged in any unlawful conduct 
relative to the foregoing matters. 
The Division next asserts Respondent engaged in 
unprofessional conduct because he aided and abetted the 
unlicenced practice of architecture when he knowingly approved 
and affixed his seal to construction plans which had been 
prepared by an unlicenced person not under his supervision. 
Consistent with the above-stated analysis, the Board similarly 
concludes no legal basis exists to find that Respondent was 
engaged in such unprofessional conduct violative of §58-1-
501(2) (a) . 
However, §58-1-501(2) defines unprofessional conduct to 
include: 
5 
(g) practicing . . . an occupation or 
profession regulated under this title through 
gross incompetence, gross negligence or a 
pattern of incompetency or negligence. 
§58-22-603 sets forth the manner in which a professional engineer 
or professional structural engineer is authorized to use a seal, 
to wit: 
(1) A professional engineer or 
professional structural engineer may only 
affix the licensee's seal to a plan, 
specification, and report when the plan, 
specification and report: 
(a) was personally prepared by the 
licensee; 
(b) was prepared by an employee, 
subordinate, associate, or drafter under the 
supervision of a licensee, provided the 
licensee or principal affixing his seal 
assumes responsibility. 
Moreover, §58-22-102(16) further provides: 
"Supervision of an employee, subordinate, 
associate, or drafter of a licensee" means 
that a licensed professional engineer, 
professional structural engineer, or 
professional land surveyor is responsible for 
and personally reviews, corrects when 
necessary, and approves work performed by any 
employee, subordinate, associate, or drafter 
under the direction of the licensee, and may 
be further defined by rule by the division in 
collaboration with the board. 
R156-22-102 thus provides: 
(11) "Unlicensed employees, subordinates, 
associates, or drafters of a person licensed 
under this chapter" means persons not 
licensed as a professional engineer who 
perform professional engineering . . . 
services under the direct supervision of a 
licensed professional engineer . . . and who 
do not offer professional engineering or 
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professional land surveying services directly 
to the public. 
The structural engineering services which Respondent 
provided and the specifications which he submitted with the 
January 14, 1998 letter are critically deficient in numerous 
respects. The drawings are inaccurate and totally inadequate as 
to permit any structure to be properly built according to those 
specifications. Thus, Respondent engaged in grossly negligent 
conduct violative of §58-1-501 (2) (g) . Such conduct constitutes 
an extreme departure from the standards of practice governing all 
professional engineers. 
Further, Respondent violated §58-22-603(a) when he affixed 
his seal to the construction drawings in question when he had not 
prepared those drawings and the drawings had not been otherwise 
prepared under his supervision. Accordingly, a further factual 
and legal basis exists to enter a disciplinary sanction as to 
Respondentf s license. 
The Board duly notes Respondent's urgence that he assumed 
Cedar City building officials would contact him after they had 
reviewed the plans and specifications to thus identify any 
deficiencies which they noted as to prompt subsequent changes or 
additions to those plans and/or specifications. Nevertheless, 
Respondent's January 14, 1998 letter unambiguously recites that 
he reviewed the plans and he approved the structure as shown on 
those plans. 
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Given the numerous deficiencies in the plans and 
specifications, the Board readily finds and concludes Respondent 
either did not understand or he cavalierly ignored the fact that 
he has no authority to approve plans. Moreover, Respondent failed 
to either prepare plans and specifications which were sufficient 
as to possibly prompt the subsequent issuance of a building 
permit or he failed to supervise the preparation of such plans 
and specifications. 
Respondent cursorily reviewed the plans prepared by Mr. 
Jensen and affixed his seal to the plans without any meaningful 
review of those plans. Further, Respondent merely attached 
generic specifications to the plans. Given his wholly inadequate 
review of the plans and his entirely unwarranted reference to 
boiler plate specifications that did not comply with governing 
Code requirements, Respondent knew or should have know that he 
could not affix his seal to those plans. 
There are two aggravating circumstances which must be 
considered regarding the disciplinary sanction which should be 
entered in this proceeding. Respondent is either unable or 
refuses to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his misconduct. 
Moreover, Respondent has substantial experience as a professional 
engineer. Accordingly, he should have been well aware of the 
nature of review or supervision necessary as to warrant any 
submission of the plans and specifications. Respondent's sealing 
of the plans was completely unjustified. 
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The Board thus concludes the Recommended Order set forth 
below is necessary to address Respondent's egregious failure to 
comply with the well-recognized standards which govern all 
professional engineers in this state. The Board concludes 
Respondent's continuing practice as a professional engineer must 
be adequately monitored to protect the public. The Board 
cautions Respondent that ongoing compliance with the requirements 
of the Recommended Order set forth below is essential to maintain 
his opportunity to continue practicing as a professional engineer 
in this state. 
RECOMMENDED ORDER 
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED Respondent's license to practice as 
a professional engineer in this state shall be suspended. 
However, a stay of enforcement shall enter as to that suspension 
and Respondent's license shall be placed on probation for three 
(3) years, subject to the following terms and conditions: 
(1) Within two months after this 
Recommended Order becomes effective, 
Respondent shall submit a written proposal to 
the Board which identifies a peer reviewer 
who is available and willing to generally 
review any structural or civil engineering 
services~which Respondent may subsequently 
provide. 
(2) The just-stated written proposal shall 
also provide for random audits of 20% of the 
work performed by Respondent during the 
previous six (6) months. Respondent shall 
bear the cost of such audits. The plan shall 
further provide for similar ongoing audits to 
be conducted every six (6) months. Audit 
reports shall be provided to the Board every 
9 
six months to reflect the work which has been 
reviewed and whether that work has been 
performed consistent with the standards which 
govern professional engineers in this state. 
(3), Respondent shall meet with the Board 
during the next regularly scheduled Board 
meeting conducted after this Recommended 
Order becomes effective. Respondent shall 
thereafter meet with the Board every six (6) 
months. The Board may modify the frequency of 
those meetings as subsequently warranted. 
(4) Within three months from the date this 
Recommended Order becomes effective, 
Respondent shall successfully complete the 
Utah Law and Rules Examination for 
professional engineers. Documentation shall 
be provided to the Division to thus establish 
that Respondent has timely satisfied the 
just-stated requirement. 
Should Respondent fail to comply with the above-stated terms 
and conditions or otherwise violate any statute or rule which 
governs the practice of professional engineers in this state, 
further proceedings shall be conducted and a determination made 
whether the stay of enforcement set forth herein should be 
vacated and the suspension of Respondent's license become 
effective. 
On behalf of the Professional Engineers and Professional 
Land Surveyors Licensing Board, I hereby certify the foregoing 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order were 
submitted to A. Gary Bowen, Director of the Division of* 
Occupational and Professional Licensing, on the ^t^L*-** day 
of October, 1999 for his review and action. 
Steven E>d.und 
Administrative Law Judge 
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Exhibit B 
BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE REQUEST 
FOR AGENCY REVIEW OF 
Antone R. Thompson, 
PETITIONER 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
ORDER GRANTING 
MOTION TO STRIKE, and 
ORDER ON REVIEW 
DOPL 
INTRODUCTION 
Antone R. Thompson ("Petitioner") brings this request for agency review before 
the Department of Commerce ("Department") seeking review of a decision by the 
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing ("Division"), which denied his 
request to rescind a stipulation he executed with Division representatives and the Order 
based upon that Stipulation. 
STATUTES OR RULES PERMITTING OR REQUIRING REVIEW 
Agency review of the Division's decision is conducted pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 63-46b-12, and Utah Administrative Code, R151-46b-12. 
ISSUES REVIEWED 
Whether the Division's denial of Petitioner's request to rescind the Stipulation 
was reasonable, and whether information provided by Petitioner through his affidavits 
should be stricken as not part of the Division record. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Petitioner became licensed as a professional engineer in this state on 
February 21,1989. 
2. On October 29,1999, Petitioner's license was suspended, but the suspension 
was stayed in favor of probation for three years provided he complied with certain terms 
and conditions. Such discipline was based upon the Division's conclusions that 
Petitioner engaged in grossly negligent conduct, by affixing his seal to critically deficient 
specifications, which were not prepared by him or under his supervision. According to 
the Division, Petitioner's conduct constituted "an extreme departure from the standards of 
practice governing all professional engineers." 
3. As one condition of probation, Petitioner was required to identify a peer 
reviewer who would randomly audit 20% of his work every six months. Petitioner was 
also required to meet with the Professional Engineers and Professional Land Surveyors 
Licensing Board ("Board") every six months and to complete the Utah Law and Rules 
Examination for professional engineers within three months of the 1999 Order. 
4. On June 3, 2002, an Order to Show Cause ("OSC") was issued by the 
Division, based on allegations that Petitioner had failed to comply with the 1999 Order. 
After lengthy pre-hearing negotiations and discovery, a hearing before the Board was set 
for January 12, 2005. Two days prior to the OSC hearing, on January 10, 2005, 
Petitioner's then attorney submitted a motion to withdraw as counsel and the motion was 
granted. 
5. On the day of the OSC hearing, Petitioner appeared pro se. He engaged in 
discussions with the Division's counsel about the terms of the Stipulation which was to 
resolve all disciplinary actions against him. He and counsel for the Division initialed a 
change to Paragraph 4 of the Stipulation, which deleted the language that Petitioner was 
represented by counsel. The discussions lasted approximately 40 minutes, after which 
the Petitioner and the Division's counsel signed the Stipulation. 
6. The Stipulation provided that Petitioner's license would be suspended for 
a minimum of four months, to become effective 30 days from the date the Division 
entered an order based upon the Stipulation. The Stipulation further provided that 
Petitioner bore the burden of demonstrating to the Division and the Board that he was 
competent to practice in order to have the suspension lifted. Additional relevant excerpts 
from the Stipulation are as follows: 
Paragraph 3. [Petitioner] acknowledges that he enters into this 
Stipulation knowingly and voluntarily, and that other than what is 
contained in this agreement, no promise or threat has been made by the 
Attorney General, the Division, or any member, officer, agent or 
representative of the Division or the Attorney General to induce him to 
enter into this agreement. 
Paragraph 5. [Petitioner] understands he is entitled to [a] hearing before 
the Professional Engineers and Professional Land Surveyors Licensing 
Board ("the Board"), at which time he may present evidence on his own 
behalf, call witnesses, and confront adverse witnesses. Respondent 
acknowledges that by executing this document he waives the right to a 
hearing and any other rights to which he may be entitled in connection 
with said hearing. 
Paragraph 6. A Notice of Agency Action and Order to Show Cause have 
been issued in this matter, and the Division and the Respondent agree that 
this Stipulation and Order shall be the full and final resolution of all 
allegations and claims raised in the Order to Show Cause. If the 
Stipulation is adopted by the Director of the Division, no further action 
shall be taken by the Division based upon the allegations and claims raised 
in the Order to Show Cause. 
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7. The Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") briefly discussed the Stipulation 
with the parties prior to adjourning the hearing. A transcript of that discussion provides 
in pertinent part: 
The Court: .. .The Division is represented by Lenore Epstein, Assistant 
Attorney General, State of Utah. The Respondent, Antone R. Thompson 
is present. And Mr. Thompson, I believe you are representing yourself; is 
that correct? 
Mr. Thompson: Correct. 
The Court: The hearing in this case was scheduled to commence on 
January 12,2005 at 10:00 a.m. before the Professional Engineers and 
Professional Land Surveyors Board. It is approximately 10:23, and over 
the last 30 to 40 minutes, Ms. Epstein and Mr. Thompson have been 
reviewing the terms of a proposed stipulation as to resolve this case by 
agreement between the parties and eliminate the need for a hearing before 
the Board on today's date... 
Mr. Thompson, I just wanted to confirm one procedural matter with 
relation to all this. It's something you and I discussed briefly when I first 
saw you this morning. Mr. Harold Reiser was representing you in this 
proceeding, and he filed a motion to withdraw as counsel. And I believe 
you were aware of that motion; were you not? 
Mr. Thompson: Correct. 
The Court: .. .Mr. Reiser mentioned yesterday during our discussion that 
there was still the possibility this case could be resolved by agreement 
between yourself and the Division. And as I've just indicated, that's 
exactly what has occurred here in this case. And I believe you have been 
provided a copy of that written stipulation; have you not? 
Mr. Thompson: Yes. 
*** 
The Court: Mr. Thompson, anything else at this point on your behalf? 
Mr. Thompson: No. 
(January 12, 2005, Hearing Transcript, pp. 3-6). 
8. By order dated January 16, 2005, the Stipulation was adopted by the 
Division Director. 
9. On January 18,2005, Petitioner filed a document entitled "Rescission of 
Stipulation." The Division filed a motion to strike Petitioner's Rescission of Stipulation 
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and the two motions came for an evidentiary hearing before the Division on February 11, 
2005. That hearing is hereafter referred to as the "rescission hearing." 
10. On February 18,2005, the Division issued its Order denying Petitioner's 
request to rescind the Stipulation. That Order included various findings of fact, which are 
hereby adopted as follows: 
Finding No. 4. [Petitioner] appeared for the January 12, 2005 hearing without 
legal counsel. Prior to the scheduled commencement of that hearing, Ms. Epstein 
and [Petitioner] informed the Court that the parties desired to pursue final 
settlement negotiations. The Court granted that request and the parties' review of 
a possible stipulation proceeded for approximately forty (40) minutes. 
Finding No. 5. [Petitioner] ultimately elected to resolve this proceeding by 
agreement and he thus signed the January 12, 2005 Stipulation... 
Finding No. 6. Paragraph 10(a) of the January 12, 2005 Stipulation recites that 
[Petitioner's] license "shall be suspended for a minimum of four months from the 
effective date of this Order." Paragraph 7 of the January 12, 2005 Stipulation 
provides that the January 12, 2005 Stipulation and Order will be "classified as a 
public document" and that the "terms and conditions of the Stipulation and Order 
will be effective thirty (30) days after the date it is signed by the Director." 
Finding No. 8. ...Ms. Inglesby [the Division's Administrative Assistant] reviewed 
the Stipulation and Order to enter the change in [Petitioner's] license status. 
Finding No. 9. Ms. Inglesby noted that [Petitioner's] license was to be suspended 
for a minimum of four (4) months. However, she did not locate the provision in 
Paragraph 7 of the January 12, 2005 Stipulation that the suspension would not 
become effective until thirty days after the date of the order. There are numerous 
and lengthy recitals in the January 12, 2005 Stipulation and the provision 
suspending [Petitioner's] license is not located in the same paragraph as the one 
which identified when that suspension would become effective. Given those 
circumstances, Ms. Inglesby mistakenly entered [on the Division's website] the 
present status of [Petitioner's] license as being suspended. 
Finding No. 10. Ms. Inglesby made the entry for the Division's website on 
January 13,2005. The screen with that entry was accessible to the public on 
January 14,2005. [Petitioner] subsequently became aware of that entry when a 
contractor or other working associate informed [Petitioner] of their belief that his 
license was suspended as reflected on the Division's website. 
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Finding No. 11. [Petitioner] then filed the "Rescission of Stipulation", which 
included the claim that the Division breached the January 12,2005 Stipulation 
when the suspension of [Petitioner's] license was prematurely posted on the 
Division's website. Ms. Inglesby corrected the erroneous entry on the website on 
January 18,2005. Accordingly, the screen accessible by the general public on 
January 19,2005 reflected that [Petitioner's] license was on probationary status. 
11. On March 18,2005, Petitioner filed a request for agency review. He also 
requested a stay of the Stipulation and Order and submitted his "Affidavit in Support of 
Judicial/Agency Review." This first affidavit raises new factual matters including a 1996 
incident involving Petitioner's daughter, Petitioner's speeding ticket of September 1997, 
and Petitioner's discussions with the prosecutor over both incidents. Petitioner 
subsequently submitted two additional affidavits on April 4, 2005, and April 20, 2005. 
These additional affidavits and Petitioner's memorandum in support of his request for 
agency review express Petitioner's concerns about the terms of the 1999 Order and his 
attempts to comply with that Order; they state concerns about lack of due process in the 
proceedings that led to the 1999 Order; and state new reasons why the Stipulation should 
be set aside. Petitioner has requested oral argument. 
12. On April 6, 2005, an Order was issued on Petitioner's request for a stay, 
indicating that a conditional stay order would be entered provided Petitioner first met 
certain requirements designed to monitor his practice. To date, Petitioner has not met 
those stated requirements. 
13. On April 22, 2005, the Division filed a Motion to Strike Petitioner's 
affidavits on the grounds that the affidavits introduce new matters and evidence not made 
part of the record below. 
14. Petitioner filed a reply memorandum in which he also responded to the 
Division's Motion to Strike. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The standards for agency review correspond to those established by the 
Utah Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA"), Utah Code Annotated Section 63-46b-
16(4). Utah Admin. Code Rl 51 -46b-12(7). 
2. This agency review is from a Division decision denying the Petitioner's 
request to set aside a Stipulation that he executed with the Division and now wishes to 
rescind. The standard of review from such denial is "abuse of discretion." Martinez v. 
Progressive Northwestern Insurance Co., 2005 UT App 297; Richins v. Delbert Chipman 
& Sons, 817 P.2d 382, 387 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). However, before such analysis, it is 
appropriate to address those matters not properly before the Acting Executive Director. 
Hence, the extensive Findings of Fact above and the detailed Section A of these 
Conclusions of Law set forth the long historical background of this matter for the purpose 
of identifying those issues that are not properly raised by Petitioner. 
A. Petitioner's Arguments 
3. In filing his Rescission of Stipulation, Petitioner included seven counts of 
arguments. The first six relate to allegations of misconduct by the Division prior to and 
during the hearing that resulted in the 1999 Order and a claim that the 1999 Order 
contained vague, ambiguous and arbitrary/capricious provisions. The seventh count 
states that the Division's premature posting of Petitioner's license suspension on its web 
site was a breach of the Stipulation and therefore requires the rescission of the 
Stipulation. 
4. At the rescission hearing, Petitioner explained that he raised the first six 
counts in order to establish a trend of misconduct by the Division. He also mentioned 
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that he did not have sufficient time to review the Stipulation and that he signed the 
Stipulation because he was told by Division representatives that they would seek the 
revocation of his license. The Petitioner stated as follows: 
Okay. As the Court knows, I didn't have the Stipulation until, like, five, 
ten minutes before the hearing. Dan Jones had informed me in the 
presence of Lenore [Epstein] that he was going to move for a revocation 
of my license, even prior to, you know, to the hearing; that really there 
was no evidence I could provide that would take outside the scope of 
revocation. And I signed that stipulation on the word of Lenore, that the 
Division is solely interested in moving this on and has no intent of injury 
tome. And that is my grounds. 
I rescinded it within three business days, and is based, even though I 
didn't say that in the rescission, was based on Dan Jones's words to me 
that, you know, "Mr. Thompson, you're way beyond. It's revocation." I 
felt that I - you know, he just doesn't like me. There is no chance here. 
And upon Lenore's promise to me that even though the stipulation was 
still vague, ambiguous to me, and apparently to some other people here at 
the DOPL, that I would go ahead and sign it on Lenore's promise to me. 
And I didn't have a whole lot of time to review. 
(February 11, 2005, Hearing Transcript, p. 14). Finally, Petitioner claimed that the 
Division breached the Stipulation by prematurely posting his suspended status. 
5. Upon agency review, Petitioner's initial memorandum and his affidavits 
raise several additional arguments for a rescission of the Stipulation, including the 
following: 
(a) the Division failed to comply with its own hearing procedures by 
not entering into the agreement two days prior to the hearing1; 
(b) that Petitioner was not represented by legal counsel; 
(c) that he was under the influence of pain medication when he signed 
the Stipulation and was not competent to enter into the Stipulation; 
and 
(d) that Petitioner signed the Stipulation under threat, duress, and 
coercion from a Division staff member and the Division's counsel. 
1
 Petitioner refers to the Notice of Notice of Agency Action and Order To Show Cause Hearing, issued by 
the Division on June 30, 2002, which specifically states that "any agreement to resolve this proceeding in 
lieu of a hearing shall be in writing and executed by the parties no later than two (2) days prior to the 
scheduled hearing." This argument by Petitioner is hereafter referred to as the "two-day rule." 
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Additional factual matters raised in the affidavits include an incident with Petitioner's 
daughter, his speeding ticket, and his discussions with a prosecutor. They also contain 
arguments that 1999 Order was vague and arbitrary, that he has in fact complied, and that 
he was not given due process in the disciplinary proceedings thai led to the 1999 Order. 
Finally, Petitioner cites for the first time on agency review the cases of Bergstrom v. 
Moore, 611 P.2d 1123, 1125 (Utah 1984) and Breuer-Harrison, Inc. v. Combe, 799 P.2d 
716, 725 Utah App. 1990), for the proposition that the Division's premature posting of 
his suspended status requires the rescission of the Stipulation and Order. 
6. In his reply memorandum, Petitioner raises yet again new arguments that 
the Division has misinterpreted or misapplied the law, the Division has abused its 
discretion, and the Division has acted contrary to its own practices. 
B. New Information and Arguments - Motion to Strike Granted 
7. The Acting Executive Director's review is limited to a review of the Division 
record. Utah Code Ann. Section 63-46b-16(4). See also Utah Admin. Code R151-46b-
12(7). Thus, all new factual information that Petitioner provides in his many affidavits 
and his memoranda on agency review, which was not initially raised before the Division, 
is an improper attempt to supplement the Division's record. Accordingly, the Division's 
Motion to Strike Petitioner's three affidavits is hereby granted. 
8. In addition, legal issues must be raised at the Division level in order to be 
properly preserved for agency review. See Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 
847 (Utah 1998) ("level of consciousness" test applied to administrative agency case, 
requiring a party to raise any issues and allow the hearing officer an opportunity to 
correct any deficiencies); Brinkerhoffv. Schwendiman, 790 P.2d 587, 589 (Utah Ct. App. 
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1990) (holding that a party must raise an objection in an earlier proceeding or waive its 
right to litigate the issue in subsequent proceedings, a principle not limited to the trial 
court setting but equally to administrative hearings). 
9. Petitioner did not properly preserve for agency review the new arguments 
he now raises regarding the two-day rule, not being represented by counsel, being under 
the influence of medications, that the Division coerced him into signing the Stipulation, 
etc. Petitioner stated at the rescission hearing that he signed the Stipulation after Division 
representatives told him that they would seek the revocation of his license, and that he 
believed at that point that "[t]here is no chance here." The above statements do not 
substantiate a claim of coercion; they allege nothing more than the Division's intent to 
seek the revocation of Petitioner's license, and Petitioner's belief that he would not be 
successful at the hearing. Moreover, there was no evidence presented by Petitioner that 
he was in fact coerced by Division representatives. Because Petitioner failed to bring 
these issues to the Division at the time of the rescission hearing, the Division had no 
opportunity to examine whether these arguments supported a rescission or setting aside of 
the Stipulation. Badger, at 847. By his own failure to raise these arguments, Petitioner 
waived them. As a result, such arguments cannot now be considered on agency review. 
Id. See also Richins, 817 P.2d at 387 (Court affirming trial court's dismissal of motion to 
set aside stipulation and declining to consider movant's arguments raised for the first 
time on appeal). 
2
 The Stipulation even states that Petitioner enters into the Stipulation knowingly and voluntarily and that 
no threats or promises were made to induce him to sign the Stipulation. Stipulation, ^ 3. 
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C. Denial of Request to Rescind Was Not Abuse of Discretion 
10. What is left then is the Division's consideration of Petitioner's arguments 
stated in his "Rescission of Stipulation" and those he raised at the OSC hearing. A 
request for relief from the Division's Order based upon the Stipulation is properly treated 
as a motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure.3 Richins, 817P.2dat387. The Richins Court stated: 
A trial court has discretion in determining whether a movant has shown 
[Rule 60(b) grounds], and this Court will reverse the trial court's ruling 
only when there has been an abuse of discretion. 
Id. Thus, as was previously stated, in determining whether the Division properly denied 
Petitioner's motion to set aside the Stipulation and Order, the applicable standard is 
"abuse of discretion." Id. A challenge based upon the grounds of abuse of discretion is 
reviewed for "reasonableness." Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 814 
P.2d 581, 587 (Utah 1991). "Furthermore, the scope of review of trial court orders 
denying rule 60(b) relief is limited.. .the reviewing court will not reach the merits of the 
underlying judgment." Martinez, 2005 UT App 297. Therefore, the Acting Executive 
Director must determine whether the Division acted reasonably in denying Petitioner's 
motion to set aside the Stipulation. 
11. In denying the Petitioner's request to rescind the Stipulation and Order, 
the Division adopted the ALJ's findings and conclusions. The ALJ had concluded that 
3
 That Rule provides that a court may, in the furtherance of justice, relieve a party from a final judgment or 
order for the following reasons: 
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; 
(2) newly discovered evidence...; 
(3) fraud...., misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; 
(4) the judgment is void; 
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged...; or 
(6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. 
Utah R. Civ. P., Rule 60(b). 
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Petitioner's attempts to establish a pattern of misconduct leading to the 1999 Order were 
removed in time, and had no rational connection to the validity of the Stipulation; that 
Petitioner's concerns regarding the terms of the 1999 Order were resolved by the parties 
by the Stipulation; and that Petitioner entered into the Stipulation knowingly and 
voluntarily, after ample opportunity to review the proposed terms. He then heard 
evidence on Petitioner's allegations that the Division breached the Stipulation to 
determine if there was any fraud, misrepresentation or any other misconduct by the 
Division so as to warrant a rescission or setting aside of the Stipulation under Rule 
60(b)(3). The ALJ concluded that the Division's conduct did not constitute such fraud, 
misrepresentation or misconduct, because the website entry was a clerical error and an 
honest mistake that was immediately corrected by the Division upon its discovery. 
12. The Division's and ALJ's conclusions were reasonable in this case. 
Petitioner's attempts to challenge the 1999 Order were properly rejected. Petitioner did 
not file a petition for judicial review of the 1999 Order, and thus gave up his opportunity 
to challenge the findings and conclusions that led to that Order. Petitioner's arguments 
that the terms of the 1999 Order were vague and arbitrary and his claims that he did in 
fact comply with the Order were also properly rejected. Such arguments would have 
been appropriate at the OSC hearing. However, Petitioner chose to avoid the OSC 
hearing and entered into the Stipulation in lieu of that hearing. The only arguments that 
were appropriate at the rescission hearing, therefore, were those provided by Rule 60(b). 
13. Finally, the ALJ considered Petitioner's arguments regarding the 
Division's conduct as to the web site posting under Rule 60(b)(3), "fraud,... 
misrepresentation, or other misconduct." The Petitioner has not challenged such Rule 
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60(b)(3) classification, and such classification was proper under the Richins decision. 
Richins, at p. 387. Based upon the testimony presented at the OSC hearing by Division 
personnel, it was not unreasonable to conclude that the Division employee made a 
clerical error or mistake (failing to notice the 30-day provision within the body of the 
Stipulation and Order), rather than engaging in misrepresentation, fraud or misconduct. 
14. On agency review, Petitioner cites to certain Utah cases that rescinded real 
estate purchase contracts based upon a statutory covenant against encumbrances. 
Bergstrom v. Moore, 677 P.2d 1123,1125 (Utah 1984) and Breuer-Harrison, Inc. v. 
Combe, 799 P.2d 716, 725 Utah App. 1990). The Division had no opportunity to rule on 
the applicability of Petitioner's legal authority, because Petitioner failed to notify the ALJ 
at the rescission hearing of his reliance on these cases. Even if he had, however, it is 
unlikely that the ALJ would have found the cases helpful to Petitioner's position. The 
courts in Bergstrom and Breuer-Harrison concluded that the seller's failure to disclose 
certain easements breached the statutory covenant and thereby the sales contract, thus 
requiring rescission of the contracts. In contrast, there is no statute in this case that 
prevents the parties to a professional license disciplinary proceeding from stipulating in 
lieu of a hearing. The case law more applicable to this matter appears to be that 
settlement agreements are generally upheld by the courts. See Ostler v. Buhler, 957 P.2d 
205, 206 (Utah 1998) (holding that "settlements are favored in the law, and should be 
encouraged, because of the obvious benefits accruing not only to the parties, but also to 
the judicial system.") 
15. Similarly, it was not unreasonable to deny Pelitioner's request to rescind 
upon the ALJ's findings that Petitioner had sufficient time to review the Stipulation. 
13 
Petitioner had approximately 40 minutes on the day of the OSC hearing to review the 
Stipulation and discuss its terms with the Division's representatives. At the beginning of 
the OSC hearing, the ALJ acknowledged on the record that the parties had reached a 
stipulation after 30 to 40 minutes of discussions; that they had signed the stipulation; that 
Petitioner's counsel had withdrawn; and that prior to his withdrawal, the attorney, had 
informed the ALJ that a stipulation could still be reached in lieu of a hearing. Petitioner 
confirmed that he was aware of his attorney's withdrawal, that he'd received a copy of 
the Stipulation and that he had nothing more to address at that time. Petitioner failed to 
inform the ALJ that he was concerned about any of the provisions in the Stipulation, that 
he did not have sufficient time to review the Stipulation, or that he disagreed with the 
ALJ's representations that they had been engaged in discussions for 30 to 40 minutes. 
16. Moreover, given the history of this matter, it is unlikely that the terms of 
the Stipulation came as a surprise to Petitioner on the day of the OSC hearing. The 
record indicates that from June 24, 2002, until the OSC hearing scheduled for January 12, 
2005, Petitioner had two attorneys. Each of these attorneys had engaged in settlement 
negotiations with the Division. As late as January 10,2005, upon withdrawing as 
Petitioner's counsel, attorney Harold Reiser informed the ALJ that the matter could still 
be settled. 
17. It is important to note that the same ALJ who received the Stipulation and 
questioned the parties on the record prior to canceling the OSC hearing was the ALJ who 
heard Petitioner's arguments at the rescission hearing. The ALJ recalled the 
circumstances leading up to the Stipulation, the discussions held in court, and the 
demeanor of the parties: 
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... [A]nd I recall it well, we came here for the hearing before the Board 
and the decision was made that morning to resolve the case by agreement. 
And so there was no evidentiary proceeding conducted before the Board at 
the time because the parties had resolved it by that stipulation. Under 
these circumstances, and the fact that you elected, having reviewed the 
proposed stipulation, to accept it as provided rather than proceed with this 
evidentiary hearing before the Board, it strikes me as a freely-given, 
intelligent, knowing election on your part to resolve the case in that 
manner. And as to that count, I don't see them under those circumstances, 
that it has any bearing on the validity of the stipulation for the reasons I've 
just stated. 
(Rescission Hearing Transcript, p 7 lines 23-25, p. 8, lines 1-16). See also Richins, at pp. 
384-385 (noting that the trial court's independent recollection of the original proceedings, 
combined with the evidence in the record, supported the conclusion that the trial court did 
not clearly err in finding that the stipulation was valid). 
18. In sum, the Acting Executive Director will not consider any new evidence 
or arguments raised by Petitioner for the first time on agency review, as her review is 
limited to evaluating the Division's record and Petitioner failed to properly preserve 
many of his legal arguments for agency review. Petitioner has also failed to prove that 
the Division's decision to deny his request to rescind the Stipulation was an abuse of 
discretion or arbitrary and capricious. Although the clerical error made by the Division is 
regrettable and unfortunate, it was not unreasonable to conclude that this honest mistake 
was not sufficient grounds to rescind the Stipulation. Additionally, given the history of 
this matter, the parties' prior settlement negotiations, and the Petitioner's opportunity to 
review the Stipulation for 40 minutes prior to signing it, it was not unreasonable for the 
Division to conclude that Petitioner had sufficient time to review the Stipulation. It is 
clear that Petitioner wishes he had not entered into the Stipulation, but such remorse is 
not sufficient grounds to set aside an agreement when Petitioner was aware of the 
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ramifications of signing the settlement agreement, he was not surprised by any new 
terms, and he did not neglect any point in reaching a settlement. Ostler, at pp. 206-207. 
As the Division points out, parties are generally bound by their stipulations, and it is their 
duty to exercise due diligence and ordinary care, including reviewing a stipulation prior 
to signing it. Yeargin, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm % 20, P.3d 287,292 (Utah 2001). 
ORDER ON REVIEW 
Because the parties have more than adequately briefed the issues in this case, 
pursuant to her discretion in Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12(4) and Utah Admin. Code, 
Rl 51-46b-12(6), the Acting Executive Director of the Department of Commerce hereby 
denies Petitioner's request for oral argument. 
The Division's decision denying Petitioner's request to rescind the Stipulation and 
Order entered on January 12, 2005, is hereby affirmed. The parties shall hereafter 
conduct themselves in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Stipulation and 
Order. 
DATED this *f ~ day of{ JUfy*, 2005. 
7 . 
Frahcine Giani, Acting Exec^ve Director 
Department of Commerce 
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL 
Judicial Review of this Order may be obtained by filing a Petition for Review 
with the Court of Appeals within 30 days after the issuance of this Order on Review. 
Any Petition for Review must comply with the requirements of Sections 63-46b-14 and 
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63-46b-16, Utah Code Annotated. In the alternative, but not required in order to exhaust 
administrative remedies, reconsideration may be requested pursuant to Bourgeous v. 
Department of Commerce, et al.9 981 P.2d 414 (Utah App. 1999) within 20 days after the 
date of this Order on Review pursuant to Section 63-46b-13. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on the Tclay of llpfaM' , 2005, the undersigned mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on Review 
by first class mail, properly addressed, postage prepaid, to: 
Antone Rodney Thompson 
350 S 500 W 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
and caused a copy to be hand-delivered to: 
J. Craig Jackson, Director 
David Stanley, Associate Director 
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Lenore Epstein, Assistant Attorney General 
Office of the Attorney General 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
"TkMtJhl 
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DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSE ; 
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PRACTICE AS A PROFESSIONAL ] 
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UTAH ; 
) SUPPLEMENTAL 
) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
I OF RESPONDENT'S REQUEST 
> FOR AGENCY REVIEW 
i (Expedited Hearing Requested) 
i Case No. DOPL-2002-123 
i Judge Masuda Medcalf 
Respondent Antone R Thompson, a licensed professional engineer 
("Thompson"), through counsel, files this Supplemental Memorandum In Support Of 
Respondent's Request For Agency Review. 
STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS1 
1. A Stipulation and Order was presented to Mr. Thompson on 
January 12, 2005, the same day a hearing on the merits of Mr. Thompson's case was 
scheduled. See Exhibit A. 
2. Mr. Thompson was not represented by counsel at the time the 
Stipulation and Order was presented to him moments before commencement of the 
scheduled hearing. See Exhibit A 
3. According to the Division's own rules and procedure, stipulations 
" . . . in lieu of a hearing shall be in writing and executed by the parties no later than two 
(2) days prior to the scheduled hearing'1 See Exhibit A-3 (emphasis added). 
4. The Stipulation and Order was presented to Mr. Thompson in 
violation of the Division's own rules and procedure, and Mr. Thompson was told that 
if he did not sign the Stipulation and Order, his license would be revoked. See Exhibit 
A; Request For Agency Review, on file. 
5. The Stipulation and Order required Mr. Thompson and the 
Division to perform certain obligations. Specifically, the Division was required to 
refrain from taking action against Mr. Thompson's license until the expiration of a 30-
day period. See Exhibit A. 
1
 Mr. Thompson incorporates all facts stated in his Affidavit, dated 
April 4, 2005, all facts stated in his prior request for agency review, as well as 
all other documents filed with the Division and regarding the Stipulation and 
Order. 
2 
6. The Division did not honor its representations and promises to 
Mr. Thompson when it took action against Mr. Thompson's license on January 13, 
2005. 
7. The Division has admitted it failed to live-up to its end of the 
deal, and Mr. Thompson has been damaged as a result of the Division's breach. 
8. Upon learning the Division breached the terms of the Stipulation 
and Order, Mr. Thompson exercised his rights under Utah law and timely rescinded 
the agreement on January 18, 2005. See Exhibit A. 
9. A determination that Mr. Thompson complied (or failed to 
comply) with the terms of the 1999 Order has never been made on the merits. 
10. Mr. Thompson has substantially complied with all of the terms 
and conditions of the 1999 Order. See Exhibit A 
ARGUMENT 
A determination suspending the only means of livelihood known to Mr. 
Thompson should be made on the merits. Mr. Thompson should receive a hearing 
on the merits underlying the Notice of Agency Action and Order to Show Cause 
because the record demonstrates that Mr. Thompson has substantially complied with 
all of the terms and conditions required of him by the 1999 Order. 5£ee Exhibit A 
There is no factual basis supporting the sanaions imposed upon Mr. Thompson by 
the January 12th Stipulation and Order. A hearing should be held to address the 
merits of this case and resolve these issues once and for all. 
3 
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BRIEF OF APPELLANT THOMPSON 
Appeal is from the lesser courts judgements, sentences, findings of fact and 
orders denying Appellant his right to due process of law. The judgements are from 
an administrative court in Salt Lake City, Salt Lake Co, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Judge Steve Eckland for the first two orders, then Masuda Medcalf for administrative 
review, presiding: 
The Department of Professional Licensing, hereinafter referred to as DOPL. 
ANTONE RODNEY THOMPSON 
350 S. 500 W. 
Cedar City 
Utah 84720 
Telephone (435)586-1345 FAX 
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C. SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT'S REQUEST 
FOR AGENCY REVIEW 
(Brief of Appellant Thompson) 
Mr. Thompson has been substantially prejudiced because he was denied 
a hearing on the merits as a consequence of some very questionable circumstances. 
First, the Stipulation and Order was presented to Mr. Thompson in violation of the 
Division's own rules and procedure requiring that it be executed at least two days 
prior to the scheduled hearing. See Exhibit A-3 {"Any agreement.. .in lieu of a hearing 
shall be in writing and executed by the parties no later than two (2) days prior to the 
scheduled hearing."). The Division has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-
making process, and has failed to follow its own rules and procedure regarding 
stipulations. See Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4)(e). Mr. Thompson's request for 
agency review should be granted. 
Second, Mr. Thompson was told that if he did not sign the Stipulation 
and Order, his license would be revoked. See Exhibit A. Mr. Thompson's "decision" 
to sign the Stipulation and Order was under a direct threat to his livelihood, and he 
believed he had no alternative but to sign the Stipulation and Order. Again, the 
Division engaged in an unlawful procedure because Mr. Thompson was under duress 
at the time he was compelled to sign the agreement or lose his license. 
Finally, Mr. Thompson was under the influence of powerful narcotics at 
the time he was pressured into signing the Stipulation and Order. Additionally, Mr. 
Thompson was not represented by counsel at the time he was presented with the 
Stipulation and Order moments before the January 12th hearing. See id.2 Had the 
2
 Mr. Thompson's attorney withdrew on January 10, 2005. 
4 
Stipulation and Order been presented to Mr. Thompson at least two days prior to the 
January 12th hearing, Mr. Thompson would have had an opportunity to have counsel 
review the agreement and advise Mr. Thompson to proceed to a hearing on the merits 
or pursue his other legal rights. 
The Stipulation and Order was signed in violation of explicit Division 
rules and procedure, and was executed under very questionable circumstances 
impairing Mr. Thompson's ability to enter into a lawful contract. Given all of these 
facts, a hearing on the merits underlying the Notice of Agency Action and Order to 
Show Cause should be held. At the very least, the Stipulation and Order should have 
been rescinded because there is no dispute the Division breached the agreement when 
it took action adverse to Mr. Thompson's license. 
I. THE DIVISION ERRED WHEN IT DENIED MR. THOMPSON'S 
MOTION TO RESCIND THE STIPULATION AND ORDER 
BECAUSE MR. THOMPSON IS ENTITLED UNDER UTAH LAW 
TO RESCIND THE STIPULATION AND ORDER AFTER THE 
DIVISION BREACHED THE AGREEMENT WHEN IT TOOK 
ACTION ADVERSE TO MR. THOMPSONS LICENSE. 
Even if the Stipulation and Order is found to have been executed 
properly and without duress or compulsion arising from the threat made to Mr. 
Thompson's livelihood, Mr. Thompson is neveirtheless entitled to rescind the 
Stipulation and Order as a remedy for the Division's breach of that agreement. This 
remedy is consistent with Utah case law and that of other jurisdictions. See, e.g., 
Bergstrom v. Moore. 677 P.2d 1123, 1125 (Utah 1984) (granting rescission when 
5 
seller breached covenant) (citing Tones v. Grow Inv. & Mortgage Co., 358 P.2d 909 
(Utah 1961): Breuer-Harrison. Inc. v. Combe. 799P.2d 716, 725 (UtahApp. 1990) 
(affirming rescission of contract where, although buyers were aware of encumbrance 
on property before purchase, they did not understand the legal implications of such 
encumbrance until five years after purchasing the property)). The Division erred 
when it denied Mr. Thompson's motion to rescind the Stipulation and Order. 
There is no dispute the Division violated its obligations under the 
explicit terms of the Stipulation and Order when it took action adverse to Mr. 
Thompson's license prior to expiration of the 30-day period set forth in the 
agreement. This undisputed fact is detailed in the Division's order denying Mr. 
Thompson's motion to rescind the agreement. See Order, on file. The fact that this 
breach is characterized as a "mistake" does not change the fact that the Division 
violated the terms of the Stipulation and Order. Mr. Thompson is entitled to rescind 
the agreement, and the Division's failure to recognize this basic remedy is arbitrary 
and capricious, and is directly contrary to Utah law. 
Mr. Thompson was induced to sign the Stipulation and Order on the 
promise that no adverse action would be taken against his license until after 30-days. 
Adverse action was taken in violation of that promise. This failure of consideration 
renders the Stipulation null and void because the Division failed to live-up to its end 
of the deal. Mr. Thompson's request for agency review should be granted and hearing 
held on the merits underlying this case. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Thompson's request for agency review should be granted because he 
has been substantially prejudiced. The Stipulation and Order is not valid given the 
questionable circumstances under which it was presented to Mr. Thompson. Even if 
it was executed validly, the Division's subsequent breach entitles Mr. Thompson to 
rescind that agreement. The Division's unwillingness to recognize Mr. Thompson's 
recission remedy under Utah law is arbitrary and capricious. Moreover, it has long 
been the public policy of Utah courts and other adjudicative tribunals to resolve issues 
on the merits. The many reasons for this sound public policy are obvious, and Mr. 
Thompson should be given the opportunity to defend himself on the merits. A 
hearing addressing the merits of this case should be held to resolve all of these issues 
once and for all. The Stipulation and Order should be vacated, and Mr. Thompson's 
request for agency review should be granted. 
DATED this 13th day of April 2005. 
ROBERT B. SYKES & ASSOCIATES, P.C., 
--**. C? 
% N M. SHEFF ^ 
Attorneys for Antone R. Thompson 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of SUPPLEMENTAL 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS REQUEST FOR 
AGENCY REVIEW were served upon all counsel of record at the addresses listed 
below, by e-mail on this 13th day of April, 2005, and by hand-delivery, this 14th day 
of April, 2005: 
Judge Masuda Medcalf 
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing 
160 East 300 South, Box 146741 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6741 
Lenore Epstein 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for the Division of Occupational 
and Professional Licensing 
Heber M. Wells Building, 5th Floor 
160 East 300 South, Box 140872 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0872 
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